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Abstract 
 
Empirical studies suggest that consumption is more sensitive to current income than 
suggested under the permanent income hypothesis, which raises questions regarding expectations 
for future income, risk aversion, and the role of economic confidence measures. This report 
surveys a body of fundamental economic literature as well as burgeoning computational modeling 
methods to support efforts to better anticipate cascading economic responses to terrorist threats 
and attacks. This is a three part survey to support the incorporation of models of economic 
confidence into agent-based microeconomic simulations. We first review broad underlying 
economic principles related to this topic. We then review the economic principle of confidence 
and related empirical studies. Finally, we provide a brief survey of efforts and publications related 
to agent-based economic simulation. 
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On the Need and Use of Models to Explore 
the Role of Economic Confidence: A Survey 
1.0 Introduction 
Bird (2002) points out that “many commentators have suggested that the world 
changed on 11 September 2001. The terrorist acts in New York and Washington made 
the future more uncertain.” Just one month after the 911 attacks, John Virgo, Executive 
Vice President of the International Atlantic Economic Society, chaired the September 11
th
 
Panel Discussion of the 52
nd
 International Atlantic Economic Conference. Virgo 
observed that consumer confidence for September was at a five year low and in October 
slid to nearly an eight year low. He also observed that October [employment] figures 
showed the largest one-month decline in more than 21 years. “This makes it difficult for 
the rate cuts by the Federal Reserve to have the desired impact” (Virgo 2001 p355). 
Virgo reminds us that the economy was already slowing down before September 11
th
. 
The Federal funds rate had been cut 7 times in 2001 before the attack and three more 
times by November. At a Fed funds rate of only 2%, many economists worried that the 
Fed was running out of room to use monetary policy. 
William J. Baumol, a panelist at the same International Atlantic Economic 
Conference, presented a more optimistic outlook, stating “The long-run benefits for the 
economy of the catastrophe are a Keynesian stimulus and replacement of obsolete 
facilities thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness” (Virgo 2001 p353). Most 
economists would probably agree that events like September 11, 2001, do affect how 
people behave, but how people react to “increased uncertainty” and what that means for 
the economy is an issue at the heart of the debate over economic theory and policy. 
The issue of uncertainty undoubtedly has broad implications for public policy, not 
the least of which will be those of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Indeed, 
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge stated in a speech at the New York Federal 
Reserve on July 8, 2003 that “Safeguarding the integrity of America's financial systems is 
a key part of homeland security.” Clearly, DHS must understand the potential effects of 
terrorist events on economic confidence and financial markets in order to make 
comprehensive comparisons of the relative effectiveness of mitigation and response 
strategies. 
Confidence and financial markets are governed largely by the economic forces at 
work within the consumption and savings decisions of discrete microeconomic agents, 
such as firms, households, and financial intermediaries. Economists provide a rigorous 
framework for investigating these forces, based largely on the groundbreaking work of 
Milton Friedman, Franco Modigliani, et al in the 1950s and 60s and culminating in 
hypotheses that form the foundation for much of our nation’s monetary and fiscal policy. 
However, modern empirical research finds that actual consumer expenditures are more 
sensitive to current income than forecast by these hypotheses, suggesting the need for 
models of consumer confidence and precautionary savings. These issues have clear 
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implications for modeling the effects of terrorist attacks on confidence and financial 
markets. 
Fortunately, the aforementioned theoretic framework integrates nicely into the 
discrete agent-based simulation framework, providing a powerful algorithmic foundation 
upon which to incorporate discrete models of confidence. This approach surpasses the 
analytical capability afforded by traditional economic modeling methods in two ways. 
First, agent models can be very complex and are less constrained by the need for 
simplifying assumptions, as is generally the case for theoretical economic models. 
Second, agent models can explore behavior under extreme circumstances that have never 
occurred in history, which is never the case with empirical economic models.  
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2.0 Risk and Uncertainty  
Without information, consumers and producers cannot successfully make rational 
decisions. Economic models of perfect competition and market equilibrium depend on 
knowledgeable economic participants. However, information about the future and about 
the actions of others is usually imperfect, and most decisions are subject to some 
uncertainty. In order to understand how economists have tried to incorporate incomplete 
or imperfect information into their models it is useful to review the development of the 
tools economists use to describe uncertainty and risk. 
2.1 Probability and Statistics 
The risk that uncertainty imposes on decision makers has been acknowledged 
throughout human history, but it is only recently that man has begun to study this 
problem from a scientific perspective. Before the use of modern techniques in statistical 
analysis, decision theory, and economics, the future was considered beyond the realm of 
human understanding. Some evidence of man’s familiarity with risk comes from early 
archeological evidence of gambling. For example, in an early form of dice played with 
astragali, or the rectangular-shaped ankle bone of a hoofed animal, players gambled on 
which side the bone would land. Recognizing that the outcome of rolling the bones was 
uncertain, individuals were willing to exchange the possibility of a loss for the chance of 
a win, or, in other words, they were willing to accept some risk. The rules associated with 
this game, however, also provide anecdotal evidence that, although the players were 
aware of facing a risk, they did not fully understand the nature of the risk. Despite the 
greater likelihood of landing on some sides than others, more difficult throws weren’t 
always given higher value. Even with the later development of “fair” dice, it was most 
likely well known among gamblers that the chances of throwing a seven with two dice 
were better than throwing a two, but the exact difference between those chances wasn’t 
formally developed until the 16
th
 century, when the concept of probability was 
introduced.  
Although there are some situations in which probabilities may not be suited to 
decision making, gambling and the purchasing of insurance are examples where the 
decision to participate involves a mathematical expectation of loss. “Gambling is 
exemplified by preferring the small probability of a large gain and the large probability of 
a small loss to the certainty of an income greater than the mathematical expectation of the 
gamble; insurance means  preferring a certain small loss to the small chance of a large 
loss” (Arrow 1971 p5).  That people have participated in gambling and are willing to buy 
insurance suggests that individuals are able to make decisions about risky situations. A 
first step, then, in understanding how we choose which actions to take when the 
consequences of those actions is uncertain is to understand probabilities. 
A famous Italian physician and self-admitted compulsive gambler, Girolamo 
Cardano, was the first author to represent probability as a fraction. In his book, Liber de 
Ludo Aleae written in 1525 and published post-humously in 1663, Cardano showed that 
the chances of throwing any number with only one die are all equal: one out of six. He 
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then continued with two dice and developed a table showing the chances of throwing 
each number from two to twelve, with the highest chances being centered on seven. 
Cardano then went on to experiment with larger numbers of dice. Being a gambler, 
Cardano distinguished between chances, and odds. “As Cardano put it, the probability of 
an outcome is the ratio of favorable outcomes to the total opportunity set. The odds on an 
outcome are the ratio of favorable outcomes to unfavorable outcomes. The odds 
obviously depend on the probability, but the odds are what matter when you are placing a 
bet” (Bernstein 1998 p53).  If the odds offered on a bet are less than the ratio of 
unfavorable to favorable outcomes, it is not a good bet. By the end of the century, 
Cardano’s ideas had spread across Western Europe. Today, these principles form the 
basis of logistic statistics and discrete choice theory. 
A few years before Cardano’s book was published, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de 
Fermat also stumbled upon probability when they developed Pascal’s triangle.  In 1654, 
the two began a correspondence discussing the problem of the points, introduced by Luca 
Paccioli in his 1494 book, Summa de arithmetic, geometria et proportionalita. “This 
brain-teaser appears repeatedly in the writings of mathematicians during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. There are many variations, but the question is always the same:  
How do we divide the stakes in an uncompleted game?” (Bernstein 1998 p43).  Pascal’s 
triangle of numbers, with each element equaling the sum of the two numbers above, 
describes the frequency of possible combinations of two outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Pascal’s Triangle. 
Each row adds to the total number of combinations. Dividing the frequency of a 
possible combination by the total number of combinations gives the probability. The top 
row describes an event with certainty. The second row describes an equal probability 
situation like flipping a coin or having a boy or girl, or winning or losing a game. Adding 
across, the total number of outcomes is 2 and the probability of each outcome is ½ or 
50%. The probability of winning two games can be found in the third row. There are four 
possible results:  one chance of winning both games, two chances of winning one and 
losing win (win then lose or lose then win), and one chance of losing both games. 
Because winning appears in three of the four possible outcomes, the probability of 
winning at least one game is 75%. The probability of winning one and losing one is 50% 
(see Bernstein p64). The stakes in Paccioli’s theoretical game should be divided 
according to the probability of each player winning the remaining number of games 
required. 
1 
1  1 
1  2  1 
1  3  3  1 
1  4  6  4  1 
1  5  10  10  5  1 
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Probabilities were very useful for keeping track of information and relating the 
likelihood of some events to others, but it still remained to discover the characteristics of 
these probabilities that would make them useful in formulating decisions about the 
unknown. The term “statistics” wasn’t actually used until around 1748, when a German 
political geographer named Gottfried Achenwall used it as a contraction for “State 
Arithmetic”. Despite the late appearance of the name, statistics had been in use for some 
time. By 1279, the King of England had declared rules and procedures for sampling the 
currency to determine the reliability of the mint. These rules did not have a mathematical 
background, however, and it would be many years before they would be improved upon. 
In 1662, John Graunt’s study on the causes and number of deaths was published. 
Natural and Political Observations made upon the Bills of Mortality was based on the 
compilation of statistics Graunt had obtained from available church records and 
government documents. Despite inaccuracies in the data, Graunt was able to make fairly 
accurate calculations of life expectancy, cause of death, male to female ratios, and total 
population. In 1693, a paper by Edmund Halley continued work based on Graunt’s 
method. Using more complete statistics than Graunt, Halley was able to determine the 
life expectancy of people at different ages and suggested the logical effects that should 
have on life insurance premiums. 
By the 18
th
 century, the methods of using sample data to draw conclusions about the 
population from which they were drawn were quickly expanded. In 1713, Nicholas 
Bernoulli finished editing and published Ars Conjectandi, a book that had been written by 
his late uncle, Jacob Bernoulli. In the book, Bernoulli states what has come to be known 
as the law of large numbers. “In its simplest form…the law states that in a sequence of 
independent trials in each of which a given event E may occur with a constant probability 
p, the probability that the relative frequency of occurrence of E in n trials differs from p 
by more than any assigned positive quantity can be made as small as desired by making n 
sufficiently large” (Arrow 1971 p14). 
Despite the value of this discovery, Bernoulli’s method would still require a very 
large number of samples to be drawn. Bernoulli presented the problem to a well known 
mathematician, Abraham de Moivre. De Moivre concluded that if a large number of 
samples are taken, most of them will be close to the mean and very few significantly far 
away. Based on this, he developed the “normal” or “bell shaped” curve to describe the 
distribution of errors in sampling about the mean.  
Two people are particularly responsible for the popularization of normal distribution. 
The first, Carl Friedrich Gauss, applied the idea to astronomy. In his 1809 book, Theoria 
Motus,  Gauss advocated observing the most common path of heavenly bodies in order to 
estimate their orbits. The Marquis Pierre Simon de Laplace applied the normal 
distribution to estimates of the population of France as well as the mass of Jupiter. He 
also expanded the theory to his central limit theorem around 1809. He stated that by 
taking the average of a set of averages obtained from a large number of samples, the 
variation about the overall mean would be less than that of the individual observation. 
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Thomas Bayes’ Essays Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 
published in Philosophical Transactions in 1764, investigated essentially the opposite of 
Bernoulli’s sampling question. Bayes asked:  Given historical evidence that a sample will 
produce a certain result, what is the probability that any one trial will vary within a 
certain range from the average?  “The primary application of the Bayseian system is in 
the use of new information to revise probabilities based on old information, or, in the 
language of the statisticians, to compare posterior probability with the priors” (Bernstein 
1998 p132). Bayes clearly formulated how people could make use of information to 
derive probabilities, but his method still required the process to start from somewhere. 
What should these original beliefs about probability be?  Here Bayes relied upon what 
many statisticians before him had settled with, Jacob Bernoulli’s Principle of Insufficient 
Reason:  “…it states that if there is no evidence leading us to believe that one of an 
exhaustive set of mutually exclusive events is more likely to occur than another, then the 
events should be judged equally probable” (Arrow 1971 p12). 
2.2 Risk and Economics 
By the time Adam Smith introduced the world to economics in 1776 (see Smith 
1937), much of the foundations for describing individual choices under uncertainty were 
in place. With the Law of Large Numbers, the Normal Distribution, the Central Limit 
Theorem, and Bayes’ Method, statisticians were prepared to measure and study risk. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to distinguish between uncertainty and risk, 
at least in the economic sense. Kenneth Arrow describes in his 1971 Essays in the Theory 
of Risk Bearing the situation of individuals facing decisions with unknown consequences 
as follows. “It is known that one out of a number of hypotheses about a given situation is 
true. The statistician has the choice of one of a number of different experiments, the 
outcome of any one of which is a random variable with a probability distribution 
depending on which of the unknown hypotheses is correct. On the basis of that outcome, 
the statistician must take some action (accept or reject a hypothesis, estimate the mean of 
a distribution to be some particular value, accept or reject a load of goods, recommend a 
change in production methods, etc.) the consequences of which depend on the action 
taken and on the hypothesis which is actually true” (Arrow 1971 p8).  In other words, 
when faced with uncertainty people will make decisions based on their perceptions of the 
risk.  In addition, Arrow requires that risk can be described by individual expectations of 
the outcome and the degree of certainty in that expectation.  Uncertainty arises when the 
outcome of an event is unknown; risk is the condition that is imposed on the decision-
making process of choosing without complete information. 
Accepting Arrow’s assumption that uncertain events are random but governed by a 
probability distribution, probability and statistics seem to be the perfect tools for 
modeling risk. But there is more at work when it comes to analyzing the effects of 
uncertainty on decision theory, even when it comes to playing games. “The principles at 
work in roulette, dice, and slot machines are identical, but they explain only part of what 
is involved in poker, betting on the horses, and backgammon” (Bernstein, 1998 p14). In 
the latter set, choice, and thus preferences, plays a part in addition to chance. In 1738, 
Daniel Bernoulli made his contribution to the history of decision making. In Papers of 
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the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, Bernoulli suggested that in addition 
to probability, which can be publicly known or estimated and is therefore potentially 
identical for everyone, utility or expected satisfaction, which varies across individuals, 
comes into play when formulating decisions. Useful examples are peoples’ reactions to 
lightning. Prior to the concept of utility, fear of being struck by lightning would have 
been considered irrational because according to probability, the chances are very small. 
“Bernoulli saw the situation more clearly: people with a phobia about being struck by 
lightning place such a heavy weight on the consequences of that outcome that they 
tremble even though they know that the odds on being hit are tiny” (Bernstein 1998 
p105). Daniel Bernoulli also hypothesized that the gain in utility one experiences is 
inversely proportionate to the wealth one already possesses. He also thought, along the 
same lines of reasoning, that the amount of utility lost due to a negative outcome would 
be greater than the amount of utility gained due to a positive outcome. 
Bernoulli’s ideas lay dormant for quite some time. In the early 19
th
 century, however, 
they were revived by a popular English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham. Bentham 
suggested that people make decisions based on their expectations of both pleasure and 
pain, or utility. William Stanley Jevons took Bentham’s ideas and explained them 
mathematically. In The Theory of Political Economy, “Jevons opens his analysis by 
declaring that ‘value depends entirely upon utility’… Jevons was confident that he had 
solved the question of value, claiming that the ability to express everything in 
quantitative terms had made irrelevant the vague generalities that had characterized 
economics up to that point. He brushed off the problem of uncertainty by announcing that 
we need simply apply the probabilities learned from past experience and observation” 
(Bernstein 1998 p190).  To paraphrase again, choices are made according to an 
individual’s value of the expected outcome, which is determined by the probability of 
occurrence for each outcome. 
Probability and economics would be forever intertwined. Utility theory led directly 
to the foundations of modern economics:  laws of supply and demand and the static 
economic model of price determination in competitive markets. 
Despite the valuable contribution to decision theory, some economists have pointed 
out fundamental problems with utility. In 1921, in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Frank 
Knight distinguishes between risk and uncertainty in his model of a competitive market 
system. “It is conceivable that all changes might take place in accordance with known 
laws, and in fact very many changes do occur with sufficient regularity to be practically 
predictable in large measure. Hence the justification and the necessity for separating in 
our study of the effects of change from the effects of ignorance of the future” (Knight, 
p198). Probability can account for the risky prospect of some foreseen changes, but the 
future remains uncertain. 
In that same year, John Maynard Keynes’ A Treatise on Probability reiterated Jules -
Henri Poincare’s point that what appears to be chance is really the result of some 
unforeseen cause and effect. Keynes pointed out that because of man’s limited 
knowledge, what is thought to be probable today, is not necessarily so tomorrow. Our 
forecasts, according to Keynes, are only degrees of belief in an uncertain future. 
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It is probably no mistake that the man who introduced us to probability was a 
gambler. He relied on his dice playing experience, the repeated sampling process of 
throwing dice, to make observations about risk in a similar way to that described by 
Bayes. In many situations, however, we are not afforded the luxury of such an easy 
experiment as rolling dice. There are many situations that we face every day that suggest 
risk, but are not so easily addressed by simple probability distributions. Arrow (1971 p5) 
provides examples, such as “…the existence of legally guaranteed incomes, variation in 
the rate of return on securities, and the holding of inventories beyond those demanded by 
pure transfer cost consideration. In a world of certainty, contractual obligations such as 
leases, bonds, and long-term labor contracts would have no significance, except possibly 
as a protection against dishonesty”. Here, again, it is reasonable to assume that we make 
assessments of risk in these situations based on experience and information, but these risk 
assessments get at the heart of the debate between probabilities as an objective measure 
and probability as a measure of belief. We can use statistics to make reasonable estimates 
of the probability of many events, but these are still estimates. The validity of statistical 
estimates is related to the number of observations available, but in addition to the daily 
risks we face (like the weather) there are infrequent or even one-time events that pose a 
risk. 
Theorists were divided. The followers of Jevons and Menger on one hand, and 
Knight and Keynes on the other: those that believed in an objective, measurable utility, 
and those who believed in a weaker, subjective utility.  
2.3 Game Theory 
In 1926, John von Neumann presented a paper on game theory to the Mathematical 
Society at the University of Gottingen that would eventually have a profound effect on 
the study of decision theory. Before the introduction of game theory, economists relied 
on the assumption of “perfect information” to model the interactions of economic agents. 
Game theory looked at competition from a more primitive point of view. 
Von Neumann described a game he had played as a young boy, match penny. In the 
game, two players choose a side of a coin and then reveal their choices to one another. If 
they match one player wins and if they don’t, the other does. Von Neumann determined 
that the best strategy was to choose heads or tails randomly and equally. He argued that if 
one player chose to reveal heads six out of every ten times, the other player would catch 
on and choose his strategy accordingly. His analysis showed that the odds of 50/50 were 
not only derived from the coins themselves, but from free choice as well. His results 
suggest that the best strategy of play is not to win the game, but rather to not lose the 
game; this was a novel idea for decision theory. 
In 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was released by von Neumann 
and Oscar Morgenstern. Being interested in von Neumann’s ideas, Morgenstern had 
encouraged him to apply his ideas to economics. The result was a new way to look at 
competition and analyze decision making. The authors developed new rules for 
determining outcomes when two, three, and many agents interact and how those 
outcomes vary as information is made available to all or some of the agents. A useful tool 
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that was developed was the concept of the zero-sum game, in which the winnings of one 
player are the losses of another. In this situation the authors were able to characterize the 
necessary conditions for a “solution” to the game. Imagine a game in which each of two 
players is to select one of two strategies available to them. The outcome of the game is 
determined by the combination of strategies chosen by the two players. If the game is a 
zero-sum game, a solution will only exist if the strategy with the largest minimum payoff 
for each player leads them to pick the strategies that will result in both players receiving 
that largest minimum payoff. If there is not this coincidence of strategies, the results of 
the game are indeterminate. There are two problems with finding the solution to games: 
(1) they must be zero-sum, and (2) they must have payoffs that make the players want to 
choose particular strategies. The authors deal with the first problem by introducing an 
additional player, “nature.”  Their idea was that the residual payoffs in a two person game 
go to an imaginary third player. In this way, all games could be conceived of as zero-sum 
games. In order to deal with the requirements of the payoff-strategy alignment needed to 
solve the game, the authors introduced “mixed strategies.”  If it was not clear what an 
opponent would choose by the design of the game, a player could calculate the expected 
payoff of each of their own strategies by applying a subjective probability to each of their 
opponents’ choices. Here, the authors do not hesitate to apply probabilities to obtain 
expected values and, in fact, rely on them as a means of solving otherwise ambiguous 
games. (see Von Neumann-Morgenstern 1944, Hurwicz, Marschak) 
To support their use of expected utility, von Neumann and Morgenstern reintroduce 
cardinal utility theory. The two authors asked an individual to choose an order of 
preference between three goods: coffee, tea and milk. If the individual preferred coffee to 
tea and tea to milk, then when asked:  given a choice between coffee for certain and a 
50/50 chance of tea or milk, what would you choose?  Obviously the person would 
choose coffee since he prefers it to either of the other two options. However, when the 
question is altered:  given a choice between tea and a 50/50 chance of coffee or milk, 
what would you choose?  The answer is not so straight forward. By varying the 
probability in the second part of the choice, von Neumann and Morgenstern were able to 
measure the relative utility that individual placed on the three goods. They also adjusted 
their experiment to analyze money. The choices were then between a certain sum of 
money for certain, and the chance of either more or less money at some probability. By 
altering the amounts and the probabilities, they were able to measure the degree of risk 
aversion, “…that is, how far we are willing to go in making decisions that may provoke 
others to make decisions that will have adverse consequences for us” (Bernstein 1998 
p239). The final result was an axiomatic approach to defining cardinal utilities that 
describe how individuals order their preferences over a variety of gambles.  
2.4 Measuring Risk Aversion 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern went to great lengths to validate their theories in 
their book, but one thing seemed certain, expected utility and its measurement was here 
to stay. In the 1960’s, both John Pratt and Kenneth Arrow, independently, developed a 
measure of local risk aversion based on the slope and curvature of mathematically 
defined utility functions. For a utility function )(xu , the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute 
  16 
risk aversion is 
)('
)(''
)(
xu
xu
xr
−
=  . When x is money or wealth, this measure of risk 
aversion has the convenient characteristic that a higher value indicates greater risk 
aversion characterized by the difference between the utility of the expected value of a 
gamble and the expected utility of the gamble. Following von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, the authors reason that there should exist some amount, a certainty 
equivalent, that a risk averse individual should be willing to accept without risk in order 
to avoid being faced with a gamble. The difference between this certainty equivalent and 
the expected value of the gamble is the individual’s risk premium. Higher measures of 
risk aversion indicate smaller certainty equivalents and, therefore, larger risk premiums. 
Relative risk aversion, or 
x
xr )(
, is a useful measure when the gamble described is relative 
to one’s existing wealth. (see Arrow 1971 chapter 4 and Pratt 1964) 
Following Pratt’s example, Roger Bowden (1972) suggested replacing the 
“stochastic life-cycle problem with a certainty equivalent problem in which expectations 
of future income receipts are adjusted by the subtraction of risk premiums, as a 
manifestation of risk aversion on the part of the individual” (p211). Bowden suggests that 
consumers decide how much to spend and how much to save in each period by evaluating 
their current and future expectations of income. Because of uncertainty about the future, 
consumers base their decisions on a certainty equivalent rather than actual income. 
Bowden also suggests that the risk premium is endogenous to the allocation problem and 
posits possible implications for the time profile of lifetime consumption. 
2.5 The Principal-Agent Problem 
It seemed as if economics had made great progress in dealing with risk, but in 1970 
George Akerlof reminded us of the limitations of using statistics to describe risk. “There 
are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge the quality of 
prospective purchases. In this case there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality 
merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose 
statistic is affected rather than to the individual seller” (Akerlof, 1970 p488). Akerlof was 
essentially applying the tragedy of the commons to a competitive market. He argued that 
in a market driven by quality statistics, there would be an incentive on the part of 
producers to make inferior products in order to cut costs. The inferior products, valued at 
the market average, would enjoy the reputation of the larger market as well as benefit 
from cheaper production methods. As more and more inferior products enter the market, 
the market statistic would be dragged down and the “lemons” would drive out the quality 
products. Akerlof extends this problem of “adverse selection” to the insurance, labor, and 
credit markets. In each case the principle, or business, must make a decision based on 
limited information about the agent with which they wish to do business. Using insurance 
as an example, if an insurance company sets its premiums based on some market statistic, 
taking into account the insured’s risk premiums, the company runs the risk of 
encouraging only the individuals with higher risk than the market average to purchase the 
insurance. 
  17 
Another example of how relying on statistical evidence may cause the purchaser of 
risk to inadvertently create undesirable incentives is moral hazard. Again, it is useful to 
think of insurance. By charging a premium based on market statistics, “The insurance 
policy might itself change incentives and therefore the probabilities upon which the 
insurance company has relied. Thus, a fire insurance policy for more than the value of 
the premises might be an inducement to arson or at least to carelessness” (Arrow 1971 
p142).  
The problems associated with contracts and incentives have become known as the 
principal-agent problem. “Consider two individuals who operate in an uncertain 
environment and for whom risk sharing is desirable. Suppose that one of the individuals 
(known as the agent) is to take an action which the other individual (known as the 
principal) cannot observe. Assume that this action affects the total amount of 
consumption or money which is available to be divided between the two individuals. In 
general, the action which is optimal for the agent will depend on the extent of risk sharing 
between the principal and the agent. The question is:  What is the optimal degree of risk 
sharing, given this dependence?” (Grossman and Dart, 1983 p7; also see Holmstrom 
1979.) 
2.6 Rational Expectations 
The study of economics has, from the beginning, been aimed at understanding 
rational behavior. Faced with scarcity, mankind must make many choices and the rational 
way to make those choices necessarily involves risk. As we have seen, economists have 
introduced risk into many of their models over the years and it has become common 
practice to describe risk with probabilities based on statistical distributions. There is some 
disagreement about whether the probabilities used should be subjective or objective, but 
there is general agreement that expectations play a crucial role in economic models.  
Following the great depression, economists began to question the complete reliance 
on free markets of the classical economists. Eventually, econometric models of aggregate 
supply and aggregate demand became the bedrock of Keynesian Macroeconomics. 
Keynes argued that the government could influence aggregate demand and therefore 
actively resist economic downturns like the great depression. Elaborate models of the 
economy were built to analyze data and estimate parameters, but Keynesian models and 
associated monetary policy performed poorly in the face of the oil shocks of the 1970’s. 
In “Expectations and Neutrality of Money”, Robert Lucas (1972) introduced what 
has become known as the Lucas Critique. “For policy analysis, the traditional 
macroeconomic models were used to describe the laws of motion of the economy in 
much the same way as an engineering model would describe the laws of motion of a 
rocket ship. The economic policymaker, like the engineer, was assumed to be playing a 
game against nature, because the economic agents in the model could not react (adjust 
their decision rules) to the policymaker’s moves. The new analysis changed the policy 
game to one against other players, where the other players, the private agents, are allowed 
to adjust to the moves of the policymaker” (Miller 1994 p3). By controlling taxes or the 
money supply, policymakers were adjusting one of the inputs just as an engineer might 
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change the mix of rocket fuel in a spaceship to adjust its flight path. How the model 
would change was predicted by the coefficients. Lucas argued, however, contrary to the 
engineering analogy, when the government made changes to the inputs in an economic 
model, those changes might affect the coefficients. That is, when the government 
changed taxes of the money supply, they were essentially changing the rules by which 
economic agents play. And when the rules change, the players change their expectations 
and the way they behave. 
The rational expectations doctrine was extended by Sargent (1973) and Barro (1974, 
1976, 1978, 1979, 1984). Miller (1994) states “The economist in the Minneapolis Fed’s 
research team… argue[d] that the Lucas critique was fatal and that new approaches had to 
be developed.” Despite the perceived failure of Keynesian macro-econometric models, 
neo-classicists such as Lucas and Sargent pursued equilibrium models based on the 
assumptions that agents are rational, reacting to policy changes in a way which is in their 
best interests privately, and that the impulses which trigger business fluctuations are 
mainly unanticipated shocks. The neo-classical rational-expectations economists 
concluded that economic agents respond to policy formation and form expectations in 
such a way to yield monetary policy neutral. That is, only relative prices matter and that 
expansive monetary policy will only cause inflation, not real growth.  
However, neo-Keynesian economists also developed models using rational 
expectations that predicted the possibility of effective government intervention leading to 
real growth. The conflicting results of neo-classicists and neo-Keynesians raised new 
questions. As with microeconomics, the introduction of risk and the expectations that 
economic agents form about an uncertain future in macroeconomic models relaxes an 
unnecessarily rigid assumption: that information is complete, free, and equally available 
to all agents. But rational expectations theory of business fluctuations, and the 
corresponding empirical work, did not provided a definitive analysis of monetary non-
neutrality and business cycles.  
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3.0  Consumer Confidence  
As their understanding of risk, uncertainty, and expectations advanced, economists 
began to incorporate these ideas into the formal models of consumption. Of particular 
interest for many decades, no more so than after 911, is how general uncertainty about 
world events affects individual consumption decisions. The popular press often cites 
consumer confidence measures as indices of risk perception, implying that aggregate 
consumption reflects these measures in some way. But do these indices measure risk 
perceptions in a way that is useful for economic analysis? Or do they reflect agents’ 
knowledge of more traditional economic indicators?  Before any link between consumer 
confidence measures and consumption can be developed, an understanding of the various 
theories of how uncertainty affects consumption is necessary.  
3.1  Psychological Economics 
An explanation of uncertainty and its role in determining consumer behavior began 
with George Katona of the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research. A 
psychologist by training, Katona developed a survey that asked people about their current 
financial situation, the business climate, and their expectations of their job and earnings 
prospects in the future. Using this survey, Katona created an index of consumer 
confidence; higher values indicated that the economic situation is good and projected by 
individuals to get better; lower values show pessimism about the economy and the future. 
Such an index is consistent with the expected utility theories discussed in the previous 
section; changes in the index value may reflect changes in perceptions of probabilities of 
future outcomes. 
The survey and confidence index reflected Katona’s view (and a budding vein of 
research) that psychology plays a role in individual consumption decisions. The 
psychological impact on consumption can be summed up by saying that consumption is 
determined by agents’ ability and willingness to buy. At its heart, psychological 
economics recognizes that agents are not “marionettes pushed around by external forces,” 
(Katona date p8). Rather than acting as automatons to changes in prices, wages, and 
income, agents determine their level (and type) of consumption based on “attitudes, 
aspirations, and expectations” (Katz 1972 p65). 
This thesis stems from the notion that consumption as a function of only prices and 
income is not well suited to the affluent post-World War II American economy. 
Consumers after WWII found themselves with discretionary income and the power to 
choose among a broad range of products and investments. Thus consumption in the U.S. 
reflected tastes, preferences, and the willingness-to-buy as much as prices and income. 
A specific representation of the consumption function is not developed as a result of 
Katona’s work. This appears to be a deliberate implication of joining psychology and 
economics; if behavior is governed by laws and is measurable, then the empirical 
observation of behavior should uncover those laws. Instead of theoretically reasoning and 
testing the hypothesis that a change in income will create predictable changes in 
consumption, the psychological economist would observe agents’ behavior (and perhaps 
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motives or perception) in response to income changes and then reason a theory to explain 
the behavior. 
3.2  Life-Cycle Theory and Permanent Income Hypothesis 
Although Katona’s work provided a framework for understanding the psychology of 
choice, the lack of a formal model of consumption would not do for most economists. In 
the years following the publication of John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory in 1936, an 
impressive literature was devoted to his hypothesis of the relationship between income 
and consumption. While this literature did not explicitly recognize the psychological 
forces involved, economists increasingly recognized that a simple model of consumption, 
one based on current income and prices was inadequate. Synthesizing this literature, 
Franco Modigliani and Richard Brumberg developed a model of consumption where 
individuals derive utility from current and future consumption, and consumption in the 
current period is a function of current income, expected income, and the individual’s 
initial set of assets. This model, known as the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) model 
describes household behavior as an attempt to smooth consumption patterns over one's 
lifetime somewhat independent of current levels of income; households do this by 
borrowing, saving, and lending. The model is typically represented as the following 
constrained maximization problem: 
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where Ct and Yt are respectively the levels of consumption and income in period t, Ut(Ct) 
is the utility received from consumption in time period t, B0 is an initial wealth 
endowment, and δ(·) and ρ(·) are discount functions; δ(·) discounts the value of future 
utility according to the household’s internal time preference, and ρ(·) discounts the value 
of future consumption and income according to the market interest rate. Also, L(t) ≤ T(t), 
where L(t) denotes the number of remaining periods in which the household can work in 
the labor market to earn income, and T(t) denotes the number of remaining periods in the 
household’s life cycle. 
The main implication is that consumption and income need not coincide in any given 
period; individuals have motives to save or dissave. The primary purpose of saving is to 
cushion against future income fluctuations, though the inclusion of uncertainty in the 
model would introduce two additional motives. First, individuals might have a 
precautionary motive, or a “desire to accumulate assets…to meet possible emergencies,” 
(Modigliani and Brumberg, 1955 p392). Second, individuals may feel the need to acquire 
an equity stake in durables in the face of uncertainty. In this case, individuals would save 
in anticipation of a consumer durables purchase so that less debt would be incurred for 
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the purchase. If consumers are uncertain of their ability to repay debts in the future, 
paying a larger share out-of-pocket would reduce the impact of such uncertainty. 
Modigliani and Brumberg find that Keynes’ hypothesis – that individuals will 
increase consumption in proportion to an increase in income – is explained by their 
model. Further, they contend that the rate of savings is constant across levels of income. 
Although a specific role for expected income appears in the model, no discussion is 
made of how those expectations are formed or how consumption changes in response to a 
change in expected income. This shortcoming is addressed to some degree by the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) and its variant the Rational Expectations Permanent 
Income Hypothesis (REPIH). 
The basic idea of PIH is that current period consumption is determined by lifetime 
resources, not measured income at a given point in time. Permanent income, then, is the 
annuity value of lifetime net worth. Consumption in a given time period is proportional to 
permanent income. Incorporating rational expectations explicitly states that agents’ 
expectations of future income are formed using all available information and with full 
knowledge of the structure of the economy.  
Under PIH, individuals determine their permanent income, and thus consumption, by 
evaluating their expectations of future income. Uncertainty exists in the path of future 
income, but the assumption of rational expectations gives rise to certainty equivalence 
with respect to contemporaneous consumption decisions; agents do not know the nature 
of future income shocks, so decisions are made as though the uncertainty does not exist. 
An implication of certainty equivalence is that only changes in expected income can 
change permanent income (and thus consumption) in the current period. For example, an 
agent who observes a higher income in the current period (perhaps the result of a wage 
increase) might expect that the higher level of income will occur in future periods, 
changing their expected future income. As a result, consumption would 
contemporaneously change. 
The response of consumption to expectations provides the most logical and 
developed role for consumer confidence in determining consumption. The strength of this 
role depends on the information consumer confidence indices contain about expected 
income. If consumer confidence adequately summarizes agents’ beliefs about future 
income, then its role is consistent with PIH. But if consumer confidence predicts current 
consumption, then it is not consistent with PIH; recall: consumption can only change as a 
result of changes in expected income. 
Several assumptions of PIH require explicit treatment. Foremost, households are 
assumed to be forward-looking. Second, credit markets must be perfect; agents must be 
able to borrow and save against future income. If an individual expects a higher future 
income, they might consume more now by borrowing against future income. Credit 
market constraints will inhibit this process and consumption would not increase until 
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future income is realized. Thus the link between expectations and consumption would be 
broken, and PIH would not be valid.  
Finally, the interest rate is assumed to be constant over time. This eliminates changes 
in consumption due the risk of interest rate fluctuations, though these concepts can be 
added to the model.  
3.3  Empirical Testing of PIH 
Though the PIH theory of consumption has been well fleshed-out, most studies reject 
the pure PIH or REPIH for a myriad of reasons. An oft-cited reason for rejection is 
Flavin’s (1981) “excess sensitivity to current income.”  An implication of Flavin’s 
consumption model is that the revision in permanent income is proportional to the 
observed error of forecasted income (i.e. “innovation in current income”). REPIH is then 
tested by whether or not the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of current 
income is zero (i.e. MPC = 0 implies acceptance of REPIH). Flavin finds that the MPC is 
significantly not equal to zero, and so determines that consumption is excessively 
sensitive to current income, thus rejecting REPIH. 
Flavin’s findings are supported by Campbell and Mankiw (1990), who finds in 
addition that the rejection of REPIH cannot be explained by relaxing the assumptions of 
constant interest rate or separability of the consumers’ utility function. 
Acemoglu and Scott (1994) also reject REPIH, but do so by incorporating a measure 
of consumer confidence. They use confidence as a proxy for individuals’ expectations 
and find that confidence is a leading indicator of consumption changes. This finding is 
inconsistent with REPIH, where only changes in income expectations can change 
consumption. 
Acemoglu and Scott’s work is also noteworthy because it defines a different role for 
consumer confidence measures. In their attempt to explain the rejection of REPIH, they 
test whether imperfect capital markets or the precautionary saving motive might account 
for confidence predicting consumption. Precautionary saving (and not imperfect capital 
markets) is found to explain the relationship. Their finding suggests a role for confidence 
measures, not for modeling income expectations, but for explaining risk aversion.  
3.4  Forecasting  
The exact link between uncertainty, expectations, and consumption is still up for 
debate, but the impact of consumer confidence on the economy and consumer 
expenditures has been thoroughly investigated. A prodigious literature is dedicated to the 
question of whether consumer confidence measures contain information important for 
economic forecasting and predicting consumer expenditures. Most of these studies, using 
various econometric models, test whether consumer confidence by itself has predictive 
content or whether adding consumer confidence improves the predictive ability of 
forecasts based on leading economic indicators.  
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The literature is divided on the predictive content of consumer confidence. When 
confidence measures are found to be significant predictors of expenditures, they often 
add little in terms of predictive ability. Some studies find no predictive value in 
confidence measures, or that consumer confidence, on it own, is a poor predictor of 
consumption. Table 1 summarizes some of the findings in the literature. 
Table 1. Summary of Findings for Confidence-Related Studies 
Study Did consumer confidence 
improve forecasting model? 
Is consumer confidence 
modeled alone or in 
conjunction with other 
variables? 
Garner (1991) Not a good predictor of 
consumption. 
Both 
Batchlor and Dua (1998) Would have helped predict 1991 
recession but not 1982 recession. 
With other variables 
Eppright, Arguca, and 
Huth (1998) 
Consumer confidence has some 
predictive power not in other 
economic indicators 
With other variables 
Howrey (2001) Consumer confidence modestly 
increases accuracy of forecasting 
models. 
Both 
Desroches and Gosselin 
(2002) 
Not helpful in predicting 
consumer spending. 
Modeled alone 
Garner (2002) Improved forecasting models 
slightly. 
With other variables 
 
These findings are not heartening for researchers seeking a role for consumer 
confidence in forecasting shocks to the economy, but additional findings provide some 
hope. Batchelor and Dua (1998) find that consumer confidence may contain important 
non-economic information. For example, they find that including a measure of consumer 
confidence in forecasting models would have help predict the 1991 recession, but not the 
1982 recession. They hypothesize that this reveals the “special circumstances” 
surrounding the 1991 recession more than does predictive ability of consumer 
confidence.  
According to Batchelor and Dua, information about shocks that are non-economic in 
nature, like the 1991 Gulf War, are contained in consumer confidence measures. In these 
cases the ability of consumer confidence to predict expenditures would be increased.  
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The findings in Garner (1991) support this view. Garner compares forecast models 
with and without consumer confidence indices over times of “ordinary circumstances,” 
(late 1987 to the first half of 1990) and “exceptional circumstances,” (late 1990 and 
1991). Forecasts with consumer confidence performed worse during the ordinary times, 
but much better during the Gulf War time period. He suggests that the improved forecast 
ability of the models with consumer confidence is due to the fact that the Gulf War was 
an unanticipated, non-economic event. 
This line of reasoning logically leads to the role of consumer confidence after a 
terrorist attack. Consumer confidence should be an important indicator of the economy 
following a terrorist attack; a shock to the economy of this sort leaves individuals little 
basis for forming expectations and making decisions using more traditional economic 
indicators. This view is not, however, borne out by the evidence following 911. Garner 
(2002) finds that the fall in consumer confidence (and the worsening recession) was not a 
result of these exceptional circumstances. Rather, the consumer confidence measures 
likely reflected the available economic information. 
Garner’s apparent contradiction of his 1991 findings points the way for further 
research into the role (if any) of consumer confidence in the economy. There is clearly a 
relationship between consumer confidence, as currently measured, and other economic 
indicators. The nature of that relationship is yet undiscovered. In particular, if consumer 
confidence does in fact contain important information in the wake of non-economic 
shocks, then it remains to be answered why consumers were so resilient after 911.  
3.5  Conclusions 
In a simplified model of the economy, individuals and firms respond to changes in 
prices by altering consumption and supply decisions based on maximizing individual 
utility or profit. This model abstracts from reality in that it gives little role to the decision-
making process and has the implication that agents behave rationally. If it is 
acknowledged that agents often make decisions based on little or faulty information, or 
that the future is uncertain, then the model poorly explains economic outcomes.  
Introducing uncertain outcomes into an economic model necessitates the 
consideration of how individuals perceive risk. By looking at individual choices as 
choices between different risky situations, decisions can be characterized as satisfying 
agents’ desire to seek or avoid risk. Uncertainty also necessitates an understanding of 
expectations. Whether considered subjectively or objectively, individual expectations of 
event probabilities ultimately determine choices between different risky situations. 
Despite what economists know about risk and uncertainty, its meaning for modeling 
responses to large shocks or terrorist attacks is, in a word, uncertain. From the consumer 
point of view (and the same argument could be made from the producer side), a likely 
scenario is that a terrorist attack increases the perceived probability of future economic 
hardship, and consumers respond by reducing current consumption. But consumer 
response to a terrorist attack depends on agents’ perceptions of how event probabilities 
change, the individual level of risk aversion, and how expectations are formed; thus, as 
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recent history suggests, a large shock will not necessarily lead to a large economic 
impact. Uncovering the conditions for such an effect is the direction for future research in 
this field. 
Although our survey has focused on the earlier fundamental literature, our research 
efforts will also incorporate more recent understanding of issues such as precautionary 
savings (Abel 1984, Wang 2004), unemployment and retirement insurance (Stiglitz and 
Yun 2002), and the role of social security.  
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4.0  Agent-Based Economics  
The inconclusive empirical findings regarding the role of confidence suggest the 
exploration of alternative modeling paradigms. We are exploring the use of agent-based 
simulation for that purpose. Agent-based economic simulation is a computational 
approach for integrating models of social choice into complex systems of artificial 
decision makers that allow researchers to conduct controlled economic experiments. The 
methodology involves the use of computer programs to distribute information, decisions, 
and communications across many well-defined economic participants who follow certain 
rules while trying to optimize their user-defined objectives (e.g. utility functions). The 
experimenter’s objective is to replicate the relevant economic activity of individuals, and 
thereby study complex collective behaviors. 
Much of the seminal work in computer simulation of social systems helped to define 
the need and role for this novel approach to explore issues. Ostrom (1988) states:  
[Computer simulation] should be viewed as a medium through which theoretical propositions can be 
articulated and predictions can be generated. It is one of several symbol systems available to theorists 
for expressing theoretic ideas. The first symbol system acquired by students in social psychology is 
natural language and the second is mathematics. Computer simulation offers a third symbol system. 
Theorists express their ideas in a program, and a computer is used to facilitate the generation of 
predictions from the theory-as-a-program. 
Gilbert and Terna (2000) expand on this statement as follows: 
The logic of developing models using computer simulation is not very different from the logic used for 
the more familiar statistical models. In either case, there is some phenomenon that we as researchers 
want to understand better. This is the “target”. We build a model of the target through a theoretically 
motivated process of abstraction (this model may be a set of mathematical equations, a statistical 
equation, such as a regression equation, or a computer program). We then examine the behavior of the 
model and compare it with observations of the social world. If the output from the model and the data 
collected from the social world are sufficiently similar, we use this as evidence in favour of the validity 
of the model. 
The processes of abstraction listed by Gilbert and Terna are well documented and 
broadly applied. For example, “a set of mathematical equations” might refer to linear or 
mixed-integer programming models, which are commonly used in applied economics. 
Such “mathematical equations” might also refer constrained optimization problems 
commonly defined in theoretical economics. Empirical economics conventionally 
employs “statistical equations” when conducting data analysis to obtain evidence for 
theoretic results. However, simulation is becoming more common in economic research 
for reasons explained by Luna and Stefansson (2000): 
Computer Simulations of economic systems are slowly gaining ground within the profession. 
Economists have become aware of the limitations of the standard mathematical formalism. On the one 
hand, when dealing with real world phenomena, it is often impossible to reach a `closed-form′ solution 
to the problem of interest. One possible approach is to simplify the problem so that an elegant closed-
form solution is synthesized. The implicit assumption is that the simplification process has spared all 
relevant elements and discarded only unnecessary ornaments. In case this a priori seems too strong, the 
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empirically oriented researcher may want to employ a simulation to study the dynamical properties of 
the system. 
McCain (2000) describes the role for comparative computer simulation as a logically 
sufficient means to explain a result by constructing a process which gives rise to the 
result. This new paradigm is similar to the more common paradigm for economic 
research, in which axiomatic results are used as a logically sufficient means to explain 
observed behavioral relationships by employing empirical data analysis to estimate 
statistical relationships that are consistent with those suggested by the axiomatic results.  
Tesfatsion (2001) states that decentralized market economies are complex adaptive 
systems defined by intricate feedbacks between microstructure and macrostructure. She 
suggests that economists (e.g. Smith 1937, Hayek 1948, and Schelling 1978) have long 
recognized this feedback, but have lacked the means to model it in its full complexity. 
However, agent-based computational economics (ACE) provides a means to “study a 
wide variety of complex phenomena associated with decentralized market economies, 
such as inductive learning, imperfect competition, trade network formation, and the open-
ended co-evolution of individual behaviors and economic institutions.” 
4.1  Foundations 
The principles of conventional economic theory and practice are founded in the 
incentives and constraints of individual economic actors, and the interaction of those 
actors, which is the exact “ground up” structural framework used in agent-based 
computational economics (ACE); see Epstein and Axtell (1996), Basu et al. (1998), Luna 
and Stefansson (2000), and Tesfatsion (2002).  
Early contributions to computational methodology were provided by Holland and 
Miller (1991) and Axelrod (1997). Agent-based modeling has since been applied to 
analyze many fundamental social issues. Elliot and Kiel (2002) provide a brief but 
illuminating survey of agent-based models used to explore cooperative and competitive 
behavior, such as Danielson’s (2002) study of reciprocity and cooperation in evolutionary 
games, Macy and Flache’s (2002) study of reinforced learning and “stochastic collusion” 
in mixed-motive games, and Epstein’s (2002) study of emergent macro-level dynamics 
related to societal breakdown. 
Much of the agent-based modeling literature has focused on problems that are 
inherently computational, such as auction markets (Farmer 2001, Zovko and Farmer 
2002, and Terna 2002), matching models such as labor markets (Sapienza and Fontana 
2002; also Chaturvedi, Metha, Dolk and Ayer 2004), and a broad literature in game 
theory (e.g. Parsons et al. 2002, Ehlen and Glass 2003). Although markets, auctions, and 
games are clearly of interest in economics, the agent literature in these topics focuses 
primarily on local behavior of limited dimension, rather than on broader economic issues.  
4.2  Framework: Object-Oriented Programming 
Object-Oriented Programming (OOP) is a natural framework for building ACE 
simulations. Examples of OOP languages include C++ (foundation for the Aspen and N-
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ABLE platforms discussed below), Objective C (foundation for the Swarm platform 
discussed below), and Java (foundation for the RePast platform discussed below). 
Luna and Stefansson (2000, see Introduction) attribute the advantages of OOP to 
four properties of OOP: abstraction, encapsulation, inheritance, and poli-morphism. Luna 
and Stefansson state, “these properties allow the programmer to conceive an agent as a 
self-contained (encapsulated) object which is the `tangible´ instance of some initial 
template (abstraction), and which has inherited some general features that define its 
essence without `hindering´ its potential development.” 
4.2.1 Templates and Instances 
OOP allows one to design agent templates, which generally include variables 
representing attributes, input parameters, or initial or boundary conditions. This feature 
affords the agent modeler the option of proceeding along two experimental paths.  
In the first case, that modeler can specify that the initial values for such variables be 
drawn randomly from specified distributions upon instantiation of each agent. This 
approach allows for models in which agents’ attributes are distributed according to some 
desirable distributions, which creates a population of desirably differentiated agents. This 
is the ACE analogue to much of theoretical economics, which is often comprised of 
mathematical models that require certain assumptions regarding the distribution of agent 
attributes. 
In the second case, the modeler can explicitly specify the attributes for each 
`tangible’ instance of a template. This is more analogous to empirically-driven models in 
applied economics, because each instantiated agent can be specified to represent actual 
known economic actors. 
The distinction between agent templates (or classes in C++ jargon) and agent 
instances (or objects in C++ jargon) is explicitly defined in OOP, making OOP a 
particularly desirable framework for the design and development of ACE simulations. 
4.2.2 Complex Agent Design 
OOP allows the modeler to design and encapsulate elemental functions and 
knowledge components for use by agents, and combine such components laterally or 
hierarchically into increasingly complex economic actors, or complex corporations of 
differentiated actors, such as firms or households. Additionally, the OOP property of 
inheritance provides a powerful means to sequentially incorporate simpler templates into 
broader templates. See Schildt (2003). 
4.2.3 Object-Oriented Software Packages 
Free packages exist for general-purpose agent-based modeling, including SWARM 
and REPAST.  
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SWARM
1
 was originally created at the Santa Fe Institute, but is currently managed by 
the not-for-profit Swarm Development Group, founded to support the development of the 
SWARM software package for multi-agent simulation of complex systems. SWARM is 
available in Java and Objective C. See Luna and Stefansson (2000) and Luna and Perrone 
(2002) for applications of SWARM to problem domains. 
REPAST
2,3
 was initially created at the University of Chicago, but is currently 
managed by the non-profit volunteer Repast Organization for Architecture and 
Development (ROAD). REPAST is used at Argonne National Laboratory’s Center for 
Complex Adaptive Systems Simulation (CCASS). REPAST models can be developed in 
Java, C#, Managed C++, Visual Basic.Net, Managed Lisp, Managed Prolog, and Python 
scripting. REPAST claims utilities for discrete-event, system-dynamics, and social 
network models. 
4.3  Key Application: Adaptive Agent Systems 
One of the key areas of interest in the field are multi-agent models in which the 
agents are designed to learn and evolve in ways that are not specified a priori. This 
approach allows researchers to discover possible outcomes arising from a complex 
system. 
Adaptive agent systems are systems of agents in which the agents adapt using 
information obtained in the course of the simulation. The principles of adaptive systems 
were largely explored by John Holland (1992, 1996, 1999) with his introduction of 
genetic algorithms. 
4.3.1 Adaptive Agents 
Adaptive agents are used in many types of industrial and scientific applications. 
Arizona State University Professor of Supply Chain Management Kevin Dooley, on his 
website, defines [adaptive] agents as “semi-autonomous units that seek to maximize some 
measure of goodness, or fitness, by evolving over time.” We further refine this definition 
by stating that an agent is adaptive if a unique instantiation of the agent can process and 
use information obtained in the course of simulation to modify its internal algorithms 
(decisions) to better achieve a set of objectives (e.g. some measure of goodness or 
fitness). Adaptive agents are important for many problems and applications in the field of 
agent-based computational economics. 
4.3.2 Evolutionary Agents 
Evolutionary agents refer to a collection of semi-autonomous units, in which the 
characteristics of successful individual units are transferred to the population of units. 
The journal Evolutionary Computation describes this field to include “computational 
agent systems drawing their inspiration from nature, with particular emphasis on 
evolutionary algorithms, including, but not limited to, genetic algorithms, evolution 
                                                 
1
 Available at http://www.swarm.org. 
2
 Available at http://repast.sourceforge.net. 
3
 Also see http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/repastsg.htm. 
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strategies, evolutionary programming, genetic programming, classifier systems, and other 
natural computation techniques.” See Basu et al (1998) and Marks (2001). 
We distinguish evolutionary agents from adaptive agents in that the successful 
behaviors of individual evolutionary agents are transferred from the individual to the 
population of agents. In non-evolutionary agent-based systems, each agent learns or 
adapts independent from other agents. The following figure distinguishes agents as 
adaptive, evolutionary, or both.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Types of Agents in Adaptive Systems 
Evolutionary agents are appropriate for simulating some, but not all, economic 
phenomena. For example, repeated bidding in a competitive spot market would probably 
be better simulated by non-evolutionary adaptive agents who independently learn to 
identify the spot price. In contrast, evolutionary agents are probably more appropriate to 
simulate the inherently evolutionary process by which competitive industries bankrupt 
inefficient firms and adopt efficient technologies and effective business models. Often, 
economic simulations employs agents that are both adaptive and evolutionary.  
4.3.3 Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
CAS is a common phrase used to describe many types of systems. Dooley defines a 
CAS as a system that “behaves/evolves according to three key principles: order is 
emergent as opposed to predetermined, the system’s history is irreversible, and the 
system’s future is often unpredictable.” Dooley offers examples, including “economies, 
ecologies, weather, traffic, social organizations, and cultures.”  
There is a growing literature aimed at modeling economics within the context of 
complex adaptive systems. See Anderson et al. (1988), Arthur et al. (1997), and 
Tesfatsion (2001). Such adaptive ACE systems represent a subset of ACE, as illustrated 
in the figure below. Non-adaptive, or steady-state, agent-based systems are made up of 
fixed agents with static decision rules, in which the agents neither learn, nor transfer their 
characteristics to the rest of the population of agents. 
Adaptive 
Agents 
Evolutionary 
Agents 
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Figure 3. Adaptive versus Static ACE Systems 
A system of non-adaptive agents can be an adaptive system if new agents can evolve 
from old agents in such a way that the new agents become increasing successful at 
achieving their objectives.  
Although most of the emphasis in ACE has been on adaptive systems, an agent-
based system need not be adaptive to identify meaningful and even emergence behavior. 
Steady-state ACE models can be used to explore the converge properties and identify 
emergent outcomes of economic systems. For example, Sprigg and Ehlen (2004) use 
static agents to demonstrate convergence to calculable theoretical economic equilibriums, 
but also discover unpredicted emergent behavior stemming from the complexity of the 
economic interactions. 
4.4  Related Methods 
The agent-based paradigm is often compared to systems-dynamics and discrete-
events paradigms, which follow similar principles such as interacting objects with 
internal processes and rules. 
4.4.1 System-Dynamics Models 
Systems Dynamics (Sternman 2000) simulation is not unrelated to discrete-events 
simulations, but typically employ differential-equations and feedback loops, and usually 
afford a more macro-scale perspective to system problems than agent-based simulation. 
O’Donoghue (2001), Pylkkänen (2001), Spielauer and Vencatasawmy (2001), Baldini 
(2001), and Levy et al. (2001) apply dynamic microsimulation to classic problems in 
applied economics. Premier commercial packages include Stella and iThink
4
 from ISEE 
Systems. Other packages include VenSim
5
 and PowerSim
6
.  
4.4.2 Discrete-Events Models 
Discrete-event and agent-based simulations follow similar principles and are 
fundamentally the same class of simulation. Information and rules are distributed among 
objects, which interact with each other and the [global] environment in the course of 
simulation. There arguably exist two subtle distinctions between what is usually inferred 
by the terms discrete-event and agent-based.  
                                                 
4
 Available at http://www.iseesystems.com. 
5
 Available at http://www.vensim.com. 
6
 Available at http://www.powersim.com. 
Adaptive 
ACE Systems 
ACE Systems 
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The first distinction derives from the degree to which information and behavior is 
embedded within the objects of the simulation. Agent-based models are largely designed 
for applications in which [nearly] all aggregate activity arises from local activity within 
the nodes, with little or no global control. Discrete-event simulations are often designed 
to model top-down control systems. 
The second possible distinction derives from the intended use of the simulation. 
Discrete-event software packages seem geared for design of systems, where the user 
simulates the behavior of local objects under global controls. In contrast, agent-based 
models are often used to identify emergent behavior within a system of completely 
localized autonomous agents. Of course, whether or not this distinction is substantive is 
fundamentally irrelevant from a software perspective if all such simulations follow 
similar principles at both design-time and run-time.  
4.5  Agent-Based Economics Today 
This burgeoning field of agent-based computational economics (ACE) arose and 
expanded since the late 1990s partly due to increasingly powerful, cheap, and user-
friendly programming environments, but also due to cross-fertilization of economics with 
other computation-intensive disciplines.  
Although contained within the realm of economic research, ACE research is often 
conducted by and published in computational literature rather than social and economic 
literature. Therefore, ACE is defined by various literary contributions and research 
programs that transcend several disciplines. 
4.5.1  Contributors and Programs 
The following paragraphs identify several key contributors and programs in the field 
of agent-based computational economics. However, this list is by no means exhaustive, 
and might unintentionally omit some contributors at the forefront of the field. 
Sandia National Laboratories 
Richard Pryor is a retired Senior Scientist from SNL. He developed an agent-based 
simulation library called Aspen, which has been used for various efforts within DOE, 
DoD, DHS, and others (see Basu et al 1998, Barton et al 2000 and 2004, Slepoy and 
Pryor 2002, Sprigg and Ehlen 2004). The Aspen work has spawned the N-ABLE 
program currently sponsored by NISAC (listed below) and led to the formation of the 
Evolutionary Computing and Agent-Based Modeling Department at SNL. This 
department explores a myriad of problems in domains ranging from social and economic 
systems to logistics and supply-chain systems. See 
http://www.cs.sandia.gov/web9216/pubsagent/index.html. 
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 
NISAC is a DHS sponsored joint program between Sandia National Laboratories and 
Los Alamos National Laboratories. Among its efforts, NISAC is developing a high-
powered agent-based computing platform called the NISAC Agent-Based Laboratory for 
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Economics (N-ABLE). The N-ABLE effort specializes in economic simulations that 
require many agents and massive computational capacity. See 
http://www.csu836.sandia.gov/organization/div6000/ctr6200/6222/index.shtml. 
Argonne National Laboratory 
Argonne’s Center for Complex Adaptive Systems Simulation (CCASS) has used 
Swarm and RePast for various agent-based applications. CCASS co-sponsors the agent-
based social science conferences with the University of Chicago (see SSRCC). CCASS 
Deputy Director Michael J. North has related publications (e.g. Thomas et al. 2004, and 
North 2001). See http://www.dis.anl.gov/msv/cas. 
Santa Fe Institute 
SFI’s stated objective, on its website, is to emphasize “multidisciplinary 
collaboration in pursuit of understanding the common themes that arise in natural, 
artificial, and social systems.” Faculty and collaborators have explored various complex 
system approaches to the study of finance and economics (e.g. Arthur 1995, Arthur et al. 
1997, Durlauf and Young 2001, Farmer 2001). See http://www.santafe.edu. 
Purdue University 
Visiting Associate Professor of Strategic Management Shailendra Raj Mehta is co-
director of the SEAS laboratory for simulation, and has several publications (e.g. 
Chaturvedi et al. 1999, 2003-4) and working papers (e.g. Gupta et al. 2003 and Drenevich 
et al. 2004 and) related to agent-based synthetic economies. See 
http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/mehta/home.asp. 
Associate Professor of Forestry and Natural Resources Bryan Pijanowski (see 
Alexandridis and Pijanowski 2002) advised in the development of the Multi Agent-Based 
Economic Landscape (MABEL) developed within the SWARM environment to study 
behaviors and markets related to land. See 
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~bpijanow/publications.htm. 
Iowa State University 
Leigh Tesfatsion (2002) is Professor of Economics and Mathematics in the ISU 
Department of Economics. She teaches a course entitled Agent-Based Computational 
Economics (ACE), maintains an ACE website, and has authored several articles and 
books, including Judd and Tesfatsion (2005). See 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm. 
University of Chicago 
Chicago’s Social Science Research Computing Center (SSRCC) has developed and 
used the Java-based agent-based software called RePast, which borrows from the Swarm 
simulation toolkit. See http://sscs.uchicago.edu and http://repast.sourceforge.net. 
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University of Michigan 
Michigan’s Center for the Study of Complex Systems (CSCS) is an interdisciplinary 
program to facilitate research of nonlinear, dynamical, and adaptive systems. CSCS hosts 
the SwarmWiki and supports an annual adaptive systems workshop in collaboration with 
the Santa Fe Institute. See http://www.cscs.umich.edu. 
Swarm Development Group 
This is a not-for-profit organization founded to support the development of the 
Swarm software package for multi-agent simulation of complex systems. Swarm 
programming language environments include Java and Objective C. See 
http://wiki.swarm.org. 
Japan Defense Agency 
Akira Namatame (2003) is a Professor in the JDA National Defense Academy 
Department of Computer Science. He has organized the following conferences and 
workshops: (1) The Japan-Australia Joint Workshop on Intelligent and Evolutionary 
Systems: 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, (2) The Fourth International Conference on 
Computational Intelligence and Multimedia Applications: 2001, (3) The First 
International Workshop on Agent-based Approach in Economic and Social Complex  
Systems: 2002, (4) The Sixth International Conference on Complex Systems: 2002, (5) 
The Ninth Workshop on Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents: 2004. See 
http://www.nda.ac.jp/~nama. 
International Foundation on Multiagent Systems 
This is a not-for-profit corporation that co-sponsors the annual International Joint 
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. See http://www.ifmas.org. 
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4.5.2  Journals, Books and Conferences 
ACE publications have accelerated since the late 1990s. The following tables list 
some selected samples of journals, books, and conferences related to agent-based 
economics. 
Table 2. Sample ACE Articles from Selected Journals 
Journal Article 
Janssen and Jager (2003) Artificial Life 
Tesfatsion (2002) 
Bergman and Tennenholtz (2002) Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent 
Systems Tesauro and Kephart (2002) 
Bordini et al. (2000) 
Rivero et al. (1999) 
Brazilian Electronic Journal of 
Economics 
Leijonhufvud (1999) 
Meyer et al. (2003) 
Carpenter (2002) 
Edmonds (2001) 
Computational Economics 
Basu, Pryor, and Quint (1998) 
Buchta et al. (2003) Computational & Mathematical 
Organizational Theory 
Teitelbaum and Dowlatabadi (2000) 
Bertels and Boman (2001) Electronic Commerce Research 
Deveaux et al. (2001) 
Izumi and Ueda (2001) 
LeBaron (2001) 
Evolutionary Computation, IEEE 
Transactions on 
McFadzean et al. (2001) 
Group Decision and Negotiation Panzarasa et al. (2001) 
Bearce and Fisher (2002) Journal of Conflict Resolution 
Zott (2002) 
Mizuta et al. (2003) 
Chen and Yeh (2002) 
Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 
DeCanio and Watkins (1998) 
Kutschinski et al. (2003) Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control 
Negroni (2003) 
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Cedarman (2002) 
Elliott and Kiel (2002) 
Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 
Lempert (2002) 
Proceedings of the Sixth 
International Conference on 
Artificial Life 
Maza et al. (1998) 
Sallach (2003) 
Bankes et al (2002) 
Moretti (2002) 
Social Science Computer Review 
North (2001) 
 
Table 3. Selected ACE-related Books & Reports 
Successful Technical Trading Agents using genetic Programming (2004) 
Pryor et al. 
Analysis of Price Equilibriums in the Aspen Economic Model under Various 
Purchasing Methods (2002) Slepoy and Pryor. 
Agent-Based Methods in Economics and Finance: Simulations in Swarm 
(2002) Luna and Perrone eds. 
Economic Simulations in Swarm: Agent-Based Modeling and Object-
Oriented Programming (2002) Luna and Stefansson eds. 
Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth (2000) 
McCain ed. 
Evolutionary Computation in Economics and Finance (2002) Shu-Heng 
Chen ed. 
Modeling Requirement for Simulating the Effects of Extreme Acts of 
Terrorism: A White Paper (1998) Pryor et al. 
Growing a Market Economy (1997) Basu and Pryor. 
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Table 4. Selected ACE-related Conferences 
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 
International Conference on Complex Systems 
International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Multimedia 
Applications 
International Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance 
International Workshop on Agent-based Approach in Economic and Social 
Complex  Systems 
Japan-Australia Joint Workshop on Intelligent and Evolutionary Systems 
Symposium on Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 
Workshop on economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents 
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5.0  Remarks 
Positive economics (Friedman 1953) generally involves the use of accepted axioms 
to formulate a theory that explains observed behavior and forecasts the response to 
changing economic conditions. Agent-based economic simulation replaces calculus with 
computation to provide a laboratory for extending this methodology. 
Agent-based studies have largely focused on computationally intensive problem 
domains such as iterative game-theoretic applications, matching mechanisms, operations 
research, and short-run financial trading models. However, the appealing features of 
agent modeling also apply to our current efforts to model broader market decisions and 
interactions (Sprigg and Ehlen 2004, and Sprigg 2004). 
Agent-based economics is allowing us to incorporate relevant economic theory of 
Friedman, Modigliani, Bowden, Lucas, Barro, Sargent, et al. into a simulation framework 
that is less encumbered by the need for simplifying assumptions.  
We are thereby modeling a financial economy that incorporates life-cycle principles 
into a multi-market economic simulation, while simultaneously incorporating additional 
hypothetical complexity into the choices of agents to better understand and model the 
role of confidence for explaining observed behavior. Ultimately, this approach should 
allow for extrapolations to explore likely market reactions under rare and extreme 
conditions. Specific objectives include a capability to better anticipate cascading 
economic responses to terrorist threats and attacks. 
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